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Abstract 
The foreign aid -FDI relationship hypothesis is quite recent in the development literature but sparks interesting 
controversy. Existing results are inconclusive on whether the two capital flows are complementary or substitutes. 
The argument of this paper is that previous studies’ implicit treatment of developing countries as a uniform 
entity could partly be blamed for the inconclusive results. It therefore attempts a unique study for Africa and 
further disaggregates the continent into two groups based on natural resource endowment to see if some level of 
clarity can emerge for better aid allocation and policy targeting.  Employing fixed effects estimation model for a 
balanced panel of 93 countries including 42 African countries on annual data covering 1996-2008, the study 
finds that total foreign aid to Africa has positive effect on FDI. It also emerged that Production sector aid has no 
negative effect on FDI in Africa. This type of aid rather has a significant positive effect on resource-seeking FDI 
in Africa proxy for by FDI in “oil and mineral exporting African countries”. There is no evidence of rent seeking 
and/or MPK reducing effect of aid to Africa as found for developing countries in some earlier studies.  
Keywords: Foreign aid, FDI, Effects, Africa, Developing countries  
 
1. Introduction 
The relationship between official development assistance (ODA) and foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
developing countries is a quite recent debate in the development economics literature, but sparks huge 
controversy. The impending query of whether foreign aid creates positive (negative) effects in recipient country 
to attract (repel) FDI also underlies the very issue of aid effectiveness and hence a relevant debate in the 
development literature.    
Probing the foreign aid-FDI relationship, Harms and Lutz (2006) stressed aid’s role in harnessing 
infrastructure development in recipient countries who otherwise may not have been able to do, due to 
governments’ budget inadequacy and limited domestic revenue mobilisation. As infrastructure in transport and 
communication gets developed, cost of doing business reduces drastically. Foreign private investors who would 
like to take advantage of the market and resource endowment of these developing countries could be enticed to 
invest in these economies. On this score, aid is said to have a complementary impact by crowding in FDI. This 
view was echoed in the UN’s 2002 Monterrey Report of the International Conference on Financing for 
Development.  
Meanwhile, Caselli and Feyrer (2007) after adjusting for price differences find that the marginal 
product of capital (MPK) is roughly the same across countries, meaning that increasing aid flows to developing 
countries will lower the MPK in these economies. The fall in MPK would therefore be offset by outflows of 
other types of capital investments such as FDI. If this is the case, aid and FDI are clearly closer to being 
substitutes rather than being complements. This argument forgets that not all countries have reach maximum 
level of physical capital accumulation and that the investment gap in some countries is so huge that foreign aid 
inflow will just not be enough to reduce the productivity of physical capital or compete with FDI for investment 
opportunities. Economic theory from the neoclassical perspective as expressed by the Solow (1956) convergence 
hypothesis tells us that return on capital (MPK) is higher where accumulated capital stock is lower. Kosack and 
Tobin (2006) have even argued that, aid and FDI are unrelated. This is because aid is mainly oriented towards 
public expenditure through budgetary support and investment in human capital, while FDI is a private sector 
decision relatively more connected to physical capital. Again, one could not easily imagine foreign aid as an 
economic growth enabler able to create conditions for attracting FDI when aid-growth nexus is still debatable 
and market distortion externalities of aid such as Dutch disease, corruption, and ruined competition hangs on 
(Rajan & Subramanian 2007, 2011). 
Empirical studies explicit on the effects of foreign aid on FDI present mixed results (see Selaya & 
Sunesen 2008; Kimura & Todo 2007; Steve et al. 2007; Harms &Lutz 2006; Karakaplan et al. 2005; Blaise 
2005). There is the conclusion that total foreign aid does not have statistically significant positive effect on FDI. 
Rather, aid for infrastructure (infrastructure aid) is found to be significantly positive for FDI while aid in 
physical capital (production sector aid) is negative for FDI. Others see aid-FDI relationship to be donor country 
specific; arguing that aid from a particular donor country does not matter for FDI from a different country. 
Clearly the debate so far has been inconclusive. 
Given the inconclusive results so far, we argue in this article that existing literature implicit treatment 
Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development                                                                                                                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1700 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2855 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.16, 2015 
 
120 
of developing countries as a uniform entity is a strong assumption and if addressed could reveal some systematic 
differences among the different regions of the developing world in the relationship between foreign aid and FDI. 
Moreover, little effort has been made to distinguish the relationship with respect to the different categorises of 
foreign aid and the different types of FDI.     
Africa is fairly different economically, politically and in terms of the FDI it attracts from other 
developing regions.  The region’s economic structure is dominated by the primary sector and contains larger 
percentage of FDI in comparison to other regions. FDI flow and stock in other regions is mostly concentrated in 
the manufacturing and service sector (Cantwell 1997). A look at the FDI stock statistics for Africa during the 
period 1988 and 1997 shows an increase from 51.8 percent to 53.4 percent in the primary sector. Comparing this 
to the statistics in Asia and Latin America, there was rather a decline from 8.8 percent to 3.4 percent and 5.7 
percent respectively for the period under review (UNCTAD 1999a: 424-25). On a whole, figures for developing 
countries as a cohort shows a marginal increase from 6.7 percent in 1990 to 7 percent in 2002. In addition to the 
concentration of stock figures in the primary sector, annual flows to Africa between 1996 and 2002 continues to 
be concentrated in this sector representing an average of  55 percent of total flows (UNCTAD 2002a: 52).  
Knowing that FDI in Africa is traditionally resource-seeking in the extractive sectors (UNCTAD 
2008), taken on previous studies’ recommendation of redirecting more aid to complementary inputs from the 
production sector (Selaya & Sunesen 2008) tends to be controversial and disadvantageous to African economies. 
It is therefore the argument of this article that, the relationship between the two capital flows can be better 
explained when characteristics of destination country are taken into consideration. Africa may present 
significantly different results from the rest of the developing world. An establishment of this fact is crucial for 
proper targeting in aid allocation, and to resolving the capital shortage problem of African economies. It is also 
crucial for contributing to the realization of the millennium development goals (MDGs).        
On the basis of these arguments, this article makes the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: Total foreign aid to Africa has a statistically significant positive effect on FDI.   
Hypothesis 2: Production sector aid has no negative effect on FDI in Africa. It rather has a significant positive 
effect on resource-seeking FDI in Africa.   
The study is divided into five sections. Section 2 focuses on presenting the existing empirical 
discussions concerning the plausible effects of foreign aid on foreign direct investment by first looking briefly at 
the determinants of the two capital flows. Explicitly, it examines the channels through which aid can have either 
positive or negative effects on FDI. The section also presents sectoral flows of foreign aid and FDI to Africa in 
comparison to other developing regions. This is to establish the distinctiveness of the continent and hence the 
need for contextualised treatment of the debate. Following to some extent, Selaya and Sunesen (2008) model is 
adopted in this study in Section 3 to establish the study’s hypothesis. Here, foreign aid invested in economic and 
social infrastructure is distinguished from foreign aid allocated to production sectors and for ‘other uses’ to 
assess their varying impact on FDI. The econometrics method and data used in the study is discussed extensively 
in this section. Results from the empirical approach are discussed in Section 4 to provide insightful conclusions. 
Section 5 presents conclusions from the study. It also highlights some limitations of the study and suggestion for 
further research. 
 
2. Review of Relevant Literature  
Foreign aid allocation and FDI location is discussed in the literature to be influenced by varied factors. Aid 
allocation is said to be influenced by the locational disadvantages or needs of recipients and interests of donors 
while FDI is determined by the comparative locational advantages of a host country which suits the benefit 
seeking interests of investors. How then does the two capital flows relate. To start with, we first looked briefly at 
the determinants of these two capital flows.  
 
2.1 Determinants of Foreign Aid (ODA) 
Informed by the Herrod-Domar gap models, economists and development researchers have postulated foreign 
aid to stimulate economic growth (Chenery & Strout 1966; Chenery & Bruno 1962). The provision of 
development assistance (foreign aid) is meant to deal with capital shortage challenges so as to enhance the 
capacities and abilities of poor countries to develop their economies and lift themselves out of poverty. 
Historically, aid allocation has been influenced by not less than six (6) cluster of motives (Riddell, 
2007:91): (i) emergency/humanitarian support, (ii) assist recipient achieve growth and poverty reduction goals, 
(iii) show solidarity, (iv) further donor’s political and strategic interest, (v) promote commercial interest of 
donor, (vi) historical ties such as former colonies. Debate on which of these motives dominate is extensively 
documented (see Angeles et al., 2008; Berthelemy 2006; Alesina & Dollar 2000; Lumsdaine 1993; Maizels and 
Nissanke 1984 for example).   
Each motive has implication for the aid-FDI relationship debate. For instance, development effects of 
growth and poverty-reduction motive could have positive impact on FDI in general. Burnside and Dollar (2000), 
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and Collier and Dollar (2002, 2004) papers on the effectiveness of aid made conclusions which implied aid 
allocation based on this motive promotes good policies and produce poverty reduction gains. Good 
macroeconomic and governance policies and improved wealth are found to matter for FDI location decision. In 
the same way, commercial interest motive may be positive for FDI of that particular aid donor country but not 
for FDI in general; Blaise (2005) found this to be true for Japanese aid. Aid allocated on the basis of political 
interest and historical ties is viewed not to produce any development benefits but rather promotes unhealthy 
behaviours such a corruption (Alesina and Weder 2002; Tavares 2003) which is postulated to be negative for 
FDI.    
 
2.2 Determinants of FDI 
According to UNCTAD (1999a), foreign direct investment (FDI) is a long-term controlling investment in assets 
of not less than 10 percent by a foreign investor or enterprise in a foreign country. This investment is usually 
carried out to take advantage of some benefits in the foreign country (Dunning 1993). Therefore any factor that 
indicates the realisation of this motive derives in FDI and the reverse is also true.   
The ‘eclectic paradigm’ developed by Dunning (1993, 2001) highlights infrastructure development, 
broad definition of host country risks, the quality of human capital and economic policies as important factors in 
the location decision of FDI. A number of studies also support the idea that high quality infrastructure is an 
important determinant of FDI (see Steve et al. 2007; Asiedu, 2002, 2006; Wheeler & Mody 1992for example).  
Steve et al (2007) and Asiedu (2002, 2006) also indicated natural resources availability draws in FDI. 
However, Asiedu (2002, 2006) cautioned that different types of FDI react differently to host country 
characteristics. Whereas natural resources availability dominates location decision of resource-seeking FDI, host 
country market size, wealth, property right protection and governance variables greatly matter for other types of 
FDI. Trade openness and tax incentives are also found to matter for FDI. Azémar & Desbordes (2010) 
highlighted trade openness to be particular crucial for horizontal FDI. 
Factors briefly noted here are not exhaustive of the determinants of FDI but enough to properly situate 
our discussion on the link between foreign aid and FDI. It provides enough grounds to help us test the 
hypotheses mentioned earlier.   
 
2.3 Channels of Foreign Aid Effect on FDI 
To date, I am not aware of any paper that has analysed the effects of foreign aid on FDI in Africa. Existing 
papers have analyse the question for broad sample of developing countries (Selaya & Sunesen 2008; Steve et al. 
2007; Harms & Lutz 2006; Karakaplan et al. 2005) and case study of specific donor country aid and FDI 
(Kimura & Todo 2007; Blaise 2005). The conclusions reached have therefore mainly been for this sample and 
may not be true for Africa.  
The authors researching explicitly on the effects of foreign aid on FDI have identified these four broad 
possibilities by which aid can have effect on FDI: 1) positive infrastructure effect, 2) positive 
vanguard/information effect, 3) negative Marginal Product of Capital (MPK) reducing effect, and 4) negative 
rent seeking effect.  
2.3.1 Positive Infrastructure Effect 
Harms and Lutz (2006) identified that aid’s ability to improve and/or consolidates favourable domestic 
investment environment is conditional on which activities it financed. The authors found out that two critical aid 
allocations (namely aid for social and economic infrastructure) – broadly define as “infrastructure aid” - are the 
ones that reinforce the desirable qualities of recipient countries. It is argued that given its contribution to the 
development of transport and communication facility, electricity supply, education and the enhancement of 
human capital; aid invested in socio-economic infrastructure contributes to reducing the cost of doing business 
and produces the quantity and quality of skills demanded by multinationals, hence creating the favourable 
environment for attracting FDI. This positive economic effect of aid is dubbed ‘infrastructure effect’.   
Steve et al. (2007) using unbalanced panel of 52 for the period 1982-1995 also found that aid for 
infrastructure has a statistically significant positive effect on FDI. This type of aid is less likely to be 
misappropriated or nurture unproductive rent seeking activities. The authors stressed that given its physical 
nature; aid allocated to infrastructure can easily be monitored by donors and civil society. More importantly, the 
domestic population shows much optimism and interest in infrastructure projects such that governments stand 
the chance of losing its credibility and political hold if funds of this nature are misapplied. There is therefore 
little or no incentive for the public sector to misuse ‘infrastructure aid’ and hence would make effective and 
efficient use of it for the purpose for which it was allocated. Selaya & Sunesen (2008) using a panel of 84 
developing countries for the period 1970-2001 also supported the idea that infrastructure aid draws in FDI. By 
implication, aid for infrastructure (complementary inputs as referred to by Selaya & Sunesen 2008) is said to 
have a significantly positive impact on economic growth leading to the creation of enabling investment 
environment.        
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Not to say the least, the ‘eclectic paradigm’ developed by Dunning (1993, 2001) highlights 
infrastructure development, broad definition of host country risks, and the quality of human capital and 
economic policies as important factors in the location decision of multinationals’ FDI.  Beyond doubt, the main 
objective of foreign investors is the realization of profits and the security of their investment; hence anything that 
keeps cost down and assures the safety of their investment is most likely to draw in FDI.  There are countless 
empirically evidence (see Steve et al. 2007; Asiedu 2002, 2006; Wheeler & Mody 1992 for example ) which 
points out that the quality of a country’s infrastructure is an important determinant of FDI. Therefore, foreign aid 
has positive effect on FDI through its allocation for infrastructure development.  
2.3.2 Positive Vanguard/Information Effect  
Traditionally, aid-tying has been one of major routes by which the business community in a donor country gets 
involve in the economy of recipient countries. The rendering of services through undertaking contracts linked to 
aid creates an automatic flow of foreign businesses from a particular donor country to recipients of its aid.  
Apart from the above, businesses in a donor country take up investment opportunities in recipient 
countries through other various means. Kimura & Todo (2007) postulated that in as much as aid causes trade 
dependency by changing preferences and introducing donors’ practices and processes into a recipient country, so 
does aid affect the business system and environment of recipients by introducing donors’ business practices, 
procedures and systems. This effect is said to lead to selective flow of FDI due to the introduction of particular 
donor systems. Aid from a particular donor may therefore lead to FDI from that donor’s country while inhibiting 
potential FDI from other countries. This is christened ‘vanguard effect’ (Kimura & Todo 2007).   
 In an empirical analysis of donor-recipient pair of 80 observations for Japanese aid for the period 
1995-2002, Kimura & Todo (2007) found this effect to be true for Japanese aid and FDI but not so for aid in 
general. The authors explained that aid from a particular donor had no impact on FDI from other donor 
countries. Blaise (2005) also argued that aid may not lead to FDI only via trade dependency or change in 
business practice but also through induced selective favourable treatment of FDI from major aid donors by 
recipients of their aid. In this respect, aid giving is postulated to create a good rapport between donors and 
recipient governments which consequently leads to the granting of privileged considerations (such as fiscal 
incentives, reduced entry barriers and other investment bottlenecks face by foreign investors) to businesses from 
the donor country. Such a relationship generated through foreign aid would therefore reduce entry barriers, 
expropriation risks and general cost of doing business thereby crowding in FDI. Using province level data for 
China from 1980 to 1999, Blaise found that Japanese foreign aid to China have a positive impact on crowding in 
foreign investments from Japan.  
The arguments put forward have some empirical support from the FDI literature as well. Mody et al. 
(2003) have noted that in addition to the other determinants of FDI mentioned earlier, well structured 
information and knowledge about potential host country influences significantly the investment decision of 
foreign investors. The authors mentioned further that for a riskier venture such as FDI, the importance of first 
hand information to risk and cost reduction cannot be overemphasised.  By affording investor community in the 
donor country the opportunity to access privilege information on its aid recipient countries, aid is postulated to 
draw in FDI. 
2.3.3 Negative Rent Seeking Effects 
In their study, Alesina & Dollar (2000) showed that being a former colony and political ally of a donor 
guarantees more aid to a recipient than being a non-colony irrespective of the superiority of the non-colony’s 
economic policies and institutions. This suggests that neither do donors put much premium on recipients’ needs; 
quality policies and institutions nor commercial interest, but, their strategic political interest dominates. This 
behaviour tends to support ineffective governments and enhances corruption in recipient countries.  
Tavares (2003) highlighted that, foreign aid is probably one of the most fertile grounds for corruption. 
In a somewhat strong criticism of donors practice, Alesina & Weder (2002) argued that the pursuit of their 
political interest have intensified corruption in recipient countries because there is no evidence that corrupt 
governments receive less aid. The literature on foreign aid and corruption is vast and as usual produces 
contrasting results (see Knack &Rahman 2007; Dunning 2004; Knack 2001; Goldsmith 2001; Svensson 2000).  
Aid category linked to the promulgation of rent seeking behaviour is ‘food aid, emergency aid and general 
budget/programme support’. Kimura & Todo (2007) argued that ‘general programme support aid’ by definition 
relates to disbursements not directed to specific sectors while at the same time ‘humanitarian aid’ by implication 
is assistance during and after emergencies; the difficulty in monitoring and the unorganised environment in 
which these aid is used may create fertile condition for unproductive activities. Food aid on other hand stifles 
local agriculture capability, encourages dependency and promotes petty corruption among public officials.   
Aid’s impact on rent seeking and corruption goes beyond the weakening of recipient’s institutions and 
economic growth to affecting its attractiveness to foreign investors. World Bank (1998) observed that corruption 
exercises depressing impact on investment and productivity by increasing the cost of doing business and eroding 
social capital. This corroborates Acemoglu & Verdier (1998) assertion that corruption affects the protection of 
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property rights and hence turns out to be inimical to capital accumulation and institutional efficiency. Property 
right protection in a country is noted to have a significant impact on drawing in FDI (see Bénassy-Quéré et al. 
2007; Asiedu 2006; Jutting 2003; Lehman 1999). Therefore if aid promotes rent seeking behaviour and 
corruption in a recipient country, it will most likely deter investors and hence crowd out FDI. However, given 
Egger & Winner (2006) assertion that corruption does not seem to matter for FDI to developing countries, the 
negative rent seeking effect of aid insinuated above remains debatable.    
2.3.4 Negative Marginal Product of Capital (MPK) Reducing effect  
Selaya & Sunesen (2008) have argued strongly that aid invested in physical capital (aid to production sector) 
crowds out FDI. Their theoretical model showed that aid invested in physical capital competes directly with 
other types of capital. Again in the spirit of the exogenous growth model of Solow (1956) which postulates a 
negative relationship between capital accumulation and the marginal product of capital (MPK), Selaya & 
Sunesen (2008) concluded that increasing aid flows directly to the production sector increases physical capital 
accumulation and hence reduces MPK thereby crowding out FDI. This assertion is reinforced by Caselli & 
Feyrer (2007) finding that MPK is roughly the same across countries. It means therefore that increasing aid 
flows to developing countries will lower the MPK in these economies. Given the mobility of capital and rate-of-
return equalisation across countries, a fall in MPK occasioned by “production sector aid” would be offset by 
outflows of other types of capital such as FDI.  
However, Kosack and Tobin (2006) conclusion that aid and FDI are unrelated challenges the claim 
above. Kosack and Tobin’s conclusion is not without problem though. Their argument somehow overlooks a 
situation where the public sector have large investments in the service and manufacturing sectors such that 
increased capital flows in the form of aid can be invested in these sectors thereby narrowing opportunities for 
private investment or crowding out existing ones. For this reason, I argue that the effect that aid invested in the 
production sector can have on FDI may depend on the type of FDI a country attracts. Service and manufacturing 
FDI could response negatively to increased foreign aid investment in production sectors whereas resource-
seeking FDI might have positive or no relationship with aid invested in physical capital.  
Existing studies suffer two main deficiencies: first there has not been a distinction of the effects on the 
different types of FDI, and secondly the different types of FDI places different premium on the existing 
conditions in a host country but this has not been considered.  
From the FDI literature, Asiedu (2002, 2006) showed that FDI in different sectors behave somehow 
differently to the characteristics of a host country. In her study, natural resource availability is found to be 
significantly positive and dominates other variables in the investment location decision of resource-seeking FDI. 
The author further explained that the decision to invest in a country by a foreign investor interested in natural 
resources is almost solely determined by the availability of such resources in the host country. Taking this into 
consideration, the negative MPK reducing effect argument put forward by Selaya & Sunesen (2008) would be 
highly insignificant for resource-seeking FDI; given that MPK of a host country does not matter for the 
profitability of this type FDI. The implication of this is that, the disproportionate location of natural resource 
among regions of the developing world can overshadow the possible negative profitability effects of aid invested 
in production sector and draw in more FDI to resource rich countries, thereby invalidating existing conclusions. 
In view of this and contrary to previous conclusions, this study argues that aid invested in physical capital would 
not necessarily substitute FDI in natural resource-rich regions such as Africa.  
 
2.4 Differences in FDI flows: Africa and other developing regions 
In spite of the marginal role of Africa in FDI, the region has attracted increasing amounts of inward FDI in the 
past two decades. Inward flows increased from $2.4 billion in 1985 to $36 billion in 2006 with FDI stock rising 
from $40 billion in 1980 to $315 billion in 2006 (UNCTAD 2007a). This improvement is quite impressive but 
still lags behind Asia and the Americas. 
The ratio of Africa’s FDI stock to the World’s total increased marginally from 2.4 percent in 1996 to 
2.7 percent in 2008. The marginal increase is been attributed to the region’s natural resource potentials and the 
upsurge of emerging economies’ crave for these natural resources. In spite of this, the region’s share in global 
FDI compared to other developing regions is still meager. 
To highlight the importance of natural resources availability for FDI flows to Africa, it is crucial to 
note that more than three quarters of FDI to the region goes to the largest natural resource producers –Angola, 
Algeria, Libya, Mozambique, Nigeria and South Africa (UNCTAD 2008). Data from World Bank’s Africa 
database revealed that 65 percent of FDI to the region between the periods 2000-2002 went to only three 
countries: South Africa-36%; Nigeria-16%; and Angola-13% (World Bank 2004b). A look at the FDI stock 
statistics for Africa during the period 1988-1997 shows an increase from 51.8 percent to 53.4 percent in the 
primary sector. Comparing this to the statistics for Asia and Latin America, there was rather a decline from 8.8 
percent to 3.4 percent and 5.7 percent respectively for the period under review (UNCTAD 1999a: 424-25). On a 
whole, figures for developing countries as a cohort shows a marginal increase from 6.7 percent in 1990 to 7 
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percent in 2002. In addition to the concentration of stock figures in the primary sector, annual flows to Africa 
between 1996 and 2002 continued to be concentrated in this sector representing an average of  55 percent of total 
flows (UNCTAD 2002a: 52).   
Incidentally the perception that FDI to Africa is driven by the region’s natural resources endowment 
seems to be validated by the available data.  Extra capital flows in the form of foreign aid to the region can 
hardly marshal and nurture strong competitive indigenous capitalists to stand head-on with foreign investors to 
the degree of substitution. Foreign aid in this region could rather engineer simple and imitative technology which 
would strengthen the productive capabilities of indigenous firms for production and employment expansion. The 
resultant effect of this process in increased incomes and economic growth will ultimately lead to large market 
size for increased investment opportunities in other sectors of the economy for both domestic and foreign 
investors. 
If  resource-seeking FDI dominant in the Africa region does place high premium on the availability of 
natural resources relative to institutional, governance and host country productivity, then, the existing one size-
fits-all recommendation risks not appreciating the fundamental differences among the different regions of the 
developing world and the importance of this fundamentals in attracting FDI. It is of utmost importance to sketch 
out Africa and assess the aid-FDI nexus for this region.  
 
3. Methodology and Data 
In view of the literature review and the discussion so far, the study proposes a basic model where net stock FDI 
is regressed on foreign aid, governance, trade openness level of infrastructure development, population size, and 
GDP.  An Africa dummy is included to control for individual-specific time invariant factors that cannot be easily 
proxy; example is natural resource endowment.  
Given endogeneity problem and unchanging trend of some variables especially that of governance, 
fixed effects estimation method is adopted for a balanced panel of 93 developing countries including 42 Africa 
countries for the period 1996-2008 of the form; 
lnFDIit = β1lnPopit+β2lnGDP it +β3lnODAit+β4lnWgovit + β5lnODAit *lnWgovit + β6lnxtit  + β7Infrait +αi  + αt+ 
uit......... (1) 
Model (1) would be estimated for all 93 developing countries as a cohort and re-estimated separately 
for the 42 Africa countries as a cohort; here, the Africa dummy will be removed. The dependent variable FDIit is 
the net stock of inward FDI in country i at time t, with data taken from the UNCTADstat International Direct 
Investment database. This measure of FDI was similarly used by Kimura & Todo (2007) in their study. Popit is 
the population size of country i at time t, and GDPit is Gross domestic product in current US dollars with both 
data taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank (2010). Population is included to 
control for country size. GDP is a measure of market size which reflects the potential domestic demand of 
multinationals goods and services. The inclusion of these variables is to account for the effect of host country 
wealth on FDI (Azémar & Desbordes 2010). ODAit is foreign aid disbursement to country i at time t with data 
taken from the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS). Wgovit is a vector of governance variables 
constructed from Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al. 2009). The variables are voice and 
accountability, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, 
rule of law, and control of corruption.  Here the scale of measurement is normalised by changing it from the 
range of -2.5 to +2.5 to the range of 5 to 10 and in both cases indicating worst to best. The Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) dataset do not report data for the years 1997, 1999, and 2001; these were therefore 
interpolated. Consistent with FDI literature, including measures of quality of governance and institutions is 
indispensable in FDI regressions.  ODAit*Wgovit is an interaction term of foreign aid and governance to test for 
Karakaplan et al. (2005) assertion that aid only has a positive impact on FDI in an environment of good 
governance.  
Other control variables are xtit representing a measure of trade openness which is the share of trade in 
GDP in line with Karakaplan et al. (2005) and Infrait is a measure of the level of infrastructure development. 
Infrastructure is proxy for by the per-capita stock of fixed telephone mainlines in line with Azémar & Desbordes 
(2010).  Data on the two variables is taken from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank (2010).   
Africa dummy (αi) and time dummies (αt) are included. Africa dummy takes the value of 1 for Africa 
countries in the sample and 0 otherwise. The time dummies are included to control for unobserved time-specific 
factors common to all countries. A test for the inclusion of time dummies confirms its need.   uit is the error term. 
From model (1), β1 (coefficient of population size) is indeterminate; it could be positive, negative or 
insignificant. The net effect of population would depend on the relevance of local demand to FDI location 
decision and the externalities either positive or negative that growing population creates. Plausible externalities 
such as wide spread poverty and public health concerns could be detrimental to the attraction and sustainability 
of FDI (Azémar & Desbordes 2009).  
β2 (GDP) is expected to be positive since high GDP creates market for investment and market size is 
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found to be one of the most robust and significant determinants of FDI. β3 (ODA) is expected to be insignificant 
in developing countries cohorts in line with existing conclusions but significantly positive for the Africa cohort 
in line with this article’s hypothesis 1. Since β4 (six governance indicators) is a mixture of variables for 
governance, we expect varied results. For instance, whereas rule of law; political stability and control of 
violence/terrorism; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; and control of corruption are expected to have 
positive effect; voice and accountability is expected not to matter for FDI. It is expected that the premium placed 
on rule of law and political stability for FDI to Africa will be high.  Since majority of the governance variables is 
expected to be positive, the composite governance variable is therefore expected to have positive effect on FDI. 
Results for each of the governance variables will be presented. Β5 (ODA*Composite Governance) is expected to 
be positive in all the two cohorts in line with existing conclusions. Β6 (trade openness), and β7 (level of 
infrastructure development) are expected to be significantly positive since openness and improved infrastructure 
have a desirable effect on FDI. However, the significance of trade openness for FDI to Africa is not expected to 
be high due to the type of FDI Africa attracts.  
The different classifications of foreign aid are said to impact on FDI in different ways. Positive effect 
of infrastructure aid (aid disbursed for social and economic infrastructure), negative MPK reducing effect of 
production sector aid (aid disbursed to sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, trade, banking and tourism), 
and rent seeking effect of ODA-other (food, emergency/humanitarian, general budget support aid) have been 
postulated in the literature. We have argued in this article that, the conclusions may not apply for all developing 
regions. Existing recommendation that aid should disproportionately be allocated for complementary inputs 
(socio-economic infrastructure) is deemed to be detrimental for the economies of aid recipients with low 
physical capital accumulation, and skewed resource seeking FDI. To establish this argument, we estimate a fixed 
effects model with the three classifications of aid in the form;    
lnFDIit=β1lnPopit+β2lnGDP it +β3lnODA(I)it+ β4lnODA(I)2it + β5lnODA(k)it + β6ODA-otherit +β7lnWgovit + 
β8lnxtit  + β9Infrait + αt+ uit......... (2) 
Here ODA (I)it, ODA(k)it, ODA-otherit are infrastructure aid,  production sector aid, and ODA-other 
respectively defined above. Data on the three defined foreign aid is obtained from the OECD’s Creditor 
Reporting System (CRS). ODA (I)2it  is included to account for the non-linearity of infrastructure aid - that is to 
say the positive effect of infrastructure aid is subject to diminishing marginal returns (Selaya & Sunesen 2008). 
All other variables are as defined in model (1) and taken from sources already mentioned.    
It is expected that all three categories of aid will have positive effect on FDI to Africa (that is to say β3 
β5, β6 will be positive). However, we cannot make a definite statement on the significance of β5, and β6 because 
the various categories of FDI may react to these aid categories differently. The FDI variable in model (2) is a 
composite one.  
β4 (squared term of infrastructure aid) is indeterminate, depending on whether the anticipated positive 
productivity effect exerts negative impact on FDI or reinforces the desirable features of a potential location for 
FDI. In this article we argue that the total factor productivity (TFP) effect of this type of aid would not exert 
negative effect on FDI as put forward by Selaya & Sunesen (2008), and therefore expect β4 to be positive in all 
two cohorts. The expected effect of all other variables is same as discussed in model (1).        
The next step in this article is to ascertain if the sector biasness of FDI could account for any observed 
difference in the aid-FDI relationship between the developing countries’ cohort and the Africa cohort. We argue 
that for a resource seeking FDI, production sector aid will have significantly positive effect. We test this 
hypothesis for aid-FDI relationship in Africa. Due to unavailability of continuous disaggregate FDI data for 
Africa, an approach is adopted by splitting the Africa sample into ‘oil and mineral exporting countries’ and ‘non-
oil/mineral exporting countries’ as categorised by World Bank. The assumption here is that, oil and mineral 
exporting countries attract mostly resource-seeking FDI relative to other sectors whereas the opposite is true for 
non-oil and mineral exporters. The study acknowledges the limitation of such simplification but argue given the 
present condition of data constraint, this approach would provide us some insights into the issue under research. 
Model (2) is re-estimated for these two subsamples.  
It is expected that, in the oil and mineral exporting Africa countries cohort, aid invested in the 
production sector has a significantly positive effect on FDI for reasons stated earlier. The relationship in non-oil 
and mineral endowed countries is expected not to be significant due to the extraction of resource seeking FDI 
from total FDI in the Africa cohort. Countries included in the study are listed in Appendix.  
 
4.  Analysis of the Empirical Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
A drawn distribution curve shows that most of the variables are not normally distributed. This is not unlikely 
given the variability in the sample which also confirms the intrinsic differences among countries in the 
developing world. A Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test confirms the presence of heteroskedasticity; hence all 
the empirical results are based on robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity.   
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Table 1 presents summary statistics of the dependent and independent variables used in the study. It 
can be seen that the individual distribution of the variables does not deviate much away from their means. On 
average, the highest standard deviation was recorded for ODA-Other (commodity aid, humanitarian aid, and 
general programme support) and FDI, which is a little over 2 points above their means. The recorded deviation 
in FDI can be so considering the apparent difference in FDI flows among developing countries.   
Table 1: Summary Statistics-Developing Countries 
Note: All variables are in logarithms.  
Compare to the table 1, we could see that individual countries in the African region as presented in 
table 2 do not deviate much from the average value of FDI and ODA recorded in the region for the period under 
review. The recorded deviations for FDI and ODA are 16.2% and 7.2% lower than what was recorded for all 
developing countries. This shows that there is some degree of homogeneity among Africa countries with respect 
to FDI and foreign aid. One could also observe that the average value of ODA-other (commodity aid; 
humanitarian aid; and general programme support) is some 0.31 points higher than that of all developing 
countries in the sample. This means that, if this type of aid has any negative effect on FDI as argued by some 
authors and for which table 3 depicts negative correlation coefficient; then the crowding out effect of this 
category of aid on FDI in Africa could be more significant than for other developing countries.   
Table 2: Summary Statistics-Africa 
Table 3 depicts a positive correlation between total foreign aid (ODA) and FDI in both the Developing 
Countries and Africa cohorts. The positive infrastructure aid effect is evident in all two cohorts but slightly more 
pronounced in the Africa cohort. Governance variables such as regulation quality, political stability, voice and 
accountability, and control of corruption react with FDI differently in the two cohorts. There is evidence of 
negative rent seeking and MPK reducing effect of ‘ODA-other’ and ‘aid for production sector’ respectively in all 
the two cohorts. However, since correlation does not mean causality, we turn to the results from fixed effects 
regressions in section 4.2.  
Variable  Mean                  Std.Dev.         Min               Max 
FDI Stock 
Composite ODA 
ODA-Infrastructure 
ODA-Production Sector 
ODA-Other 
Composite Governance Indicator 
Regulation Quality 
Political Stability  
Voice & Accountability 
Government effectiveness 
Control of Corruption 
Rule of Law 
Openness 
Infrastructure per capita 
7.76                    2.08                1.74              12.84 
5.26                     1.34                0.94              9.35 
4.60                     1.39               -0.30              8.20 
2.51                     1.52               -3.91              7.00 
2.74                      2.25               -4.60             7.31 
1.95                      0.08                1.66              2.17 
1.96                      0.09                1.60              2.21 
1.94                      0.12                1.49              2.15 
1.95                      0.11                1.71              2.16 
1.95                      0.09                 1.73             2.18 
1.94                      0.08                 1.61             2.20 
1.92                     0.10                  1.37             2.15 
4.22                      0.48                  2.70            5.61 
3.49                      1.61                  -9.79          -0.86 
Variable Mean                  Std.Dev.         Min               Max 
FDI Stock 
ODA 
ODA-Infrastructure 
ODA-Production Sector 
ODA-Other 
Regulation Quality 
Political Stability 
Voice & Accountability 
Government effectiveness 
Control of Corruption 
Rule of Law 
Openness 
Infrastructure per capita 
6.98                    1.79                2.76              11.61 
5.27                     1.25                1.77              9.35 
4.47                     1.28               1.13              7.48 
2.32                     1.58               -3.91              6.31 
              3.05                     2.03               -4.61            7.19 
1.93                      0.09                1.60              2.13 
1.93                      0.14                 1.49             2.15 
1.93                     0.10                 1.71             2.14 
1.93                      0.09                  1.73            2.12 
1.94                      0.09                  1.61            2.15 
1.92                      0.10                  1.37             2.15 
4.22                      0.45                  2.88            5.62 
11.50                      1.70                  8.16          16.29 
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Table 3: Partial Correlation between FDI and the Dependent variables 
 
4.2 Estimation Results and Discussion 
Both Pooled OLS (POLS) and fixed effects estimations were computed, however discussions are centred on 
fixed effects results. Errors of measurement concerning governance variables raised by Arndt& Oman (2006) 
and as noted by Wooldridge (2002) have significant impact on POLS leading to biased and inefficient results. 
Employing fixed effects helps to deal with the measurement and endogeneity problems. Haussmann test 
confirms fixed effects estimation is more efficient than random effects estimation.    
Table 4: Total ODA’s impact on FDI 
Variables Developing Countries Africa 
POLS Fixed Effects POLS Fixed Effects  
Population -0.21*** 
(0.78) 
-2.63*** 
(0.40) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
-0.26 
(0.76) 
GPD     1.21*** 
(0.59) 
  1.59*** 
(0.09) 
     0.71*** 
(0.06) 
   0 .67*** 
(0 .14) 
ODA -0.37 
(0.44) 
0.04 
(0.02) 
0.53 
(0.53) 
2.94** 
(1.43) 
ODA*Wgovit 0.47* 
(0.44) 
0.06** 
(0.03) 
7.22*** 
(3.01) 
7.29*** 
(3.56) 
Composite Governance(lnWgovit) 0.78* 
(0 .45) 
1.20* 
(0.64) 
0.53* 
(0.10) 
7.07* 
(9.35) 
Openness 1.09*** 
(0.07) 
0.52** 
(0.09) 
1.49*** 
(0.09) 
0.60*** 
(0 .12) 
Infrastructure 0.08* 
(0.04) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
4.69** 
(0.65) 
0.13* 
(0.07) 
Control of Corruption -2.34** 
(0.74) 
0.34 
(0.51) 
-1.32 
(0.95) 
-0.63 
(0.65) 
Government Effectiveness 0.65 
(0.66) 
0.10 
(0.63) 
0.66 
(0.76) 
0.368 
(0.79) 
Political Stability 0.22 
(0.34) 
-0.17 
(0.32) 
0.48 
(0.47) 
0.68* 
(0.40) 
Regulation Quality 2.58*** 
(0.57) 
0.08 
(0.43) 
1.27 
(0.64) 
3.03** 
(1.39) 
Voice and Accountability 1.03** 
(0.35) 
-0.54 
(0.57) 
-2.60** 
(0.51) 
-3.02*** 
(0.69) 
Rule of Law -0.27** 
(0.09) 
-0.004 
(0.08) 
0.76 
(0.61) 
- 0.22 
(0.62) 
Africa Dummy 0.44*** 
(0.07) 
- - - 
Constant -23.97*** 
(1.17) 
-36.32*** 
(4.7) 
-10.28*** 
( 3.19) 
-18.84*** 
(11.41) 
Observation 1208 1208 517 517 
R-squared 0.78  0.81  
Adjusted R-Squared 0.77  0.77  
Overall R-Square  0.71  0.70 
Hausman test P-value  0.00  0.00 
Note: The asterisks ***, **, and * represents significance at 1% 5% and 10% respectively. Standard errors are in 
parenthesis in all tables.    
From table 4 GDP, openness, regulatory quality, government effectiveness, and infrastructure have the 
expected signs. However significant difference between the two cohorts appears: while regulatory quality and 
infrastructure is insignificant in the developing countries cohort, they are significantly positive determinants of 
Variable  Developing Countries Africa                       
ODA 
ODA-Infrastructure 
ODA-Production Sector 
ODA-Other 
Composite Governance Indicator 
Regulation Quality 
Political Stability  
Voice & Accountability 
Government effectiveness 
Control of Corruption 
Rule of Law 
Openness 
Infrastructure per capita 
0.18 
0.07 
-0.02 
-0.27 
0.08 
0.12 
-0.004 
0.03 
0.16 
0.008 
0.01 
0.07 
0.43 
0.12 
0.08 
-0.09 
-0.04 
0.08 
-0.06 
0.03 
-0.18 
0.03 
-0.07 
0.06 
0.55 
0.26 
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FDI to the Africa cohort. Political stability is also found to be relevant for attracting FDI to Africa but seems not 
to matter for FDI to other developing regions. 
It can be seen that while foreign aid alone is not effective in attracting FDI to developing countries as a 
cohort, it has a significantly positive impact on FDI to Africa. This gives credence to the assertion that the 
development gap in Africa is so huge that massive capital injection is needed to create conducive conditions; 
hence foreign aid in all forms could be beneficial to improving Africa’s attractiveness. In testing Karakaplan et 
al. (2005) finding, an interaction term between foreign aid and composite governance variable is included in the 
estimation and this turned out to be positive and significant in all the two cohorts in support of existing 
hypothesis. This means that foreign aid allocation based on quality of governance can improve the attractiveness 
of recipients to foreign private investors. Possibly, in a well governed country, foreign aid is put into proper use 
to improve the economic conditions of the country in comparison to poorly governed country. 
Even though we have made some progress towards establishing Africa’s distinctiveness, there still 
exists the question of whether production sector aid impacts negatively on FDI. On this question, I attempt an 
answer by estimating the effects of the three types of foreign aid on FDI. The results are depicted in table 5.  
Table 5: Channels of Aid’s effect on FDI 
Variables Developing Countries Africa 
POLS Fixed Effects  POLS Fixed Effects  
Population -0.06 
(0.08) 
-3.07** 
(0.42) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
-0.06 
(0 .82) 
GPD 1.11*** 
(0.07) 
0.77*** 
(0.13) 
0.68*** 
(0 .07) 
0.76*** 
(0.16) 
Infrastructure Aid 0.04 
(0.03) 
0.06** 
(0.03) 
0.25*** 
(0.05) 
0.07* 
(0.04) 
Infrastructure Aid2 0.004 
(0.02) 
0.05*** 
(0.01) 
0.13*** 
(0.02) 
0 .04* 
(0.02) 
Production Sector Aid -0.02 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.06 * 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
ODA-Other -0.006 
 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.008 
(0.02) 
0.007 
(0.02) 
Openness 1.14*** 
(0.07) 
0.26*** 
(0.09) 
1.47*** 
(0.09) 
0.57*** 
(0.12) 
Infrastructure 0.16** 
(0.04) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
0.26*** 
(0.04) 
0.13* 
(0.07) 
Control of Corruption -2.33*** 
(0.77) 
0.10 
(0.51) 
-1.37 
(0.97) 
-0.42 
(0.65) 
Government 
Effectiveness 
0.43 
(0.68) 
-0.31 
(0.62) 
0.36 
(0 .77) 
0.35 
(0.78) 
Political Stability 0.13 
(0.36) 
-0.03 
(0.30) 
0.12 
(0.47) 
0.34 
(0.39) 
Regulation Quality 2.46*** 
(0.58) 
1.72*** 
(0.44) 
1.09* 
(0.63) 
0.07 
(0.58) 
Voice and 
Accountability 
1.08*** 
(0.39) 
-0.72 
(0.55) 
-2.4** 
(0.55) 
-3.17*** 
(0.69) 
Rule of Law -0.21** 
(0.09) 
0.04 
(0.08) 
0.79 
(0.70) 
-0.20 
(0.62) 
Africa Dummy 0.44*** 
(0.07) 
- - 
 
- 
 
Constant -23.97*** 
(1.17) 
-32.73*** 
(4.88) 
12.43*** 
(1.94) 
-8.44 
(12.04) 
Observation 1208 1132 491 491 
R-squared 0.81  0.81  
Overall R-Square  0.73  0.77 
Hausman test P-value  0.00  0.00 
Note: The asterisks ***, **, and * represents significance at 1% 5% and 10% respectively.  
Expectedly, infrastructure aid has significantly positive effect on FDI to both the “developing 
countries” and “Africa” cohorts. There is no evidence of negative production sector aid effect on FDI. It turns 
out to be insignificant consistent with the findings of Kimuara & Todo (2007).   
In this article, it has been argued that Africa attracts disproportionately high levels of primary sector 
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resource seeking FDI than as it is the case in other developing regions. It is further argued that, for a destination 
of predominantly resource seeking FDI, production sector aid produces a significantly positive effect. The results 
so far have not supported this hypothesis; mainly because we have not been able to access disaggregate FDI data. 
We go around this problem by disaggregating the Africa sample into (a) oil & mineral exporting countries, and 
(b) non-oil & mineral exporting countries; with the assumption that cohort (a) attracts primary sector resource 
seeking FDI. Hence FDI data in this cohort is used to represent primary sector resource seeking FDI and the 
estimation result is depicted in table 6 below.  
Table 6: Aid’s impact on FDI in the two African Sub-samples 
Variables Fixed Effects Estimation 
‘Oil & Mineral exporting’ 
Fixed Effects Estimation 
‘Non-Oil & Mineral exporting’ 
Population -0.56    
(2.04) 
-0.20 
(1.93) 
GPD 1.07    
(0.63) 
0.62*** 
(0.21) 
ODA for Infrastructure 0.15*    
(0.10) 
0.20*** 
(0.07) 
ODA for Production Sector 0.04*     
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
ODA-Other 0.04*    
(0.02) 
-0.007 
(0.02) 
Openness 0.86***    
(0.25) 
0.36*** 
(0.27) 
Infrastructure 5.95**    
(2.32) 
0.95 
(1.18) 
Control of Corruption -2.32    
(1.87) 
1.52 
(1.18) 
Government Effectiveness 1.65    
(1.34) 
1.07 
(1.33) 
Political Stability 0.15    
(0.60) 
1.72* 
(0.89) 
Regulation Quality 0.70    
(1.70) 
-0.79 
(0.80) 
Voice and Accountability -6.52**    
(1.77) 
-2.81** 
(1.23) 
Rule of Law 1.01**    
(0.48) 
-2.02 
(1.88) 
Constant -15.65**   
(4.11) 
-18.05** 
(3.97) 
Observation 248 243 
Overall R-Square 0.75 0.72 
The asterisks ***, **, and * represents significance at 1% 5% and 10% respectively. 
The result as depicted in table 6 supports the second hypothesis of this article and indeed shows that 
aid invested in the production sector have a positive effect on FDI at a 10% significance level in an oil and 
mineral exporting African country. Another significant result is the positive effect of rule of law in oil and 
mineral exporting Africa cohort. In all three regression results discussed, it only in this cohort that rule of law 
has a significantly positive effect on FDI in support of Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2007) and Globerman & Shapiro 
(2002) assertion. The explanation is that given the technology and capital intensive nature of resource seeking 
FDI, strong impartial judiciary and effective laws that ensure property right protection and contract enforcement 
is absolutely one of the fundamental conditions investors would expect to be in place.  
At this point, it can be said that we have make a successful journey towards understanding the 
complexity surrounding foreign aid’s impact on FDI to some extent. However, further studies would be require 
in understanding what impact the three classification of aid have on each sector of FDI when disaggregate FDI 
data for Africa becomes available.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Due to its potential benefits of technology transfer, productivity improvement and job creation among others, 
FDI is deem to be essential for accelerating the growth of developing economies. In view of this, the attraction of 
FDI becomes a major policy issue in the growth strategies of governments. The marginal role of the developing 
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world, Africa in particular is worrying however. Noting this, development partners and the international 
community are making concerted effort to support such economies to engineer favourable environment attractive 
to private investors home and abroad. Given the implied use of foreign aid as a catalyst for creating the 
favourable investment environment demanded by the private sector, assessing its impact on FDI is not only 
relevant in its own right but also legitimate in the aid effectiveness debate.   
Notwithstanding the implied positive effect of aid, it has been argued by some that foreign aid 
encourages unproductive renting seeking activities inimical to the growth of private sector investment (Bauer 
1991, p. 45). To a certain level and for production sector, aid reduces returns on capital due to physical capital 
accumulation thereby discouraging FDI (Selaya & Sunesen 2008). Others have even argued the two capital 
flows (foreign aid and FDI) are unrelated (Kosack &Tobin 2006). There is therefore a huge controversy on 
whether foreign aid has a positive or negative effect on FDI.   
This article argues that the inconclusiveness of existing results can be attributed to the omission of 
contextual effects and the implicit treatment of developing countries as a uniform cohort. FDI attraction 
dynamics is quite varied among the developing regions; such that Africa may present a different result from the 
rest of the developing world. Given Africa’s huge development and capital gap, all the three classifications of 
foreign aid will be positive for creating conducive investment environment to attract FDI; contrary to existing 
conclusions that production sector aid and other foreign aid (food, humanitarian/emergency, and general 
programme support) are inimical to FDI.   
True to the hypothesis of this article, empirical results from the study total foreign aid have 
significantly positive effect on FDI in Africa. The effect of aid is significantly positive in an environment of 
good governance. Production sector aid has no negative effect on FDI in Africa. This type of aid rather has a 
significantly positive effect on resource-seeking FDI in Africa proxy for by FDI in “oil and mineral exporting 
African countries”. There is no evidence of rent seeking and/or MPK reducing effect of aid to Africa as found 
for developing countries in some earlier studies. It also emerged that rule of law has significant effect on drawing 
in resource-seeking FDI. This means that, to take full advantage of the nature blessings on their countries, 
natural resource-rich regions such as Africa should strengthen their institutions particularly the judiciary, ensure 
property right protection, enhance contract enforcement and give the necessary indication of no expropriation 
risks. These actions if taken would entice private foreign investors with the necessary technological and financial 
capability to invest and increase their stakes in the region so that countries can reap the benefits associate with 
FDI for accelerated economic development. To some level of surprise, one governance variable which was not 
found in all specifications to have any significant positive impact on FDI is the ‘control of corruption’. However 
as noted by Egger & Winner (2006), corruption seems not to matter for FDI to developing countries.    
Notwithstanding the thorough research conducted by this study, some issues are worth taking note of 
when making inference from the results of the study. It is important to note that the omission of other variables 
such as level of financial development, exchange rate, inflation and taxation which have been identify to be 
relevant determinants of FDI could generate some bias in the results.  
Again, the FDI literature reports lag reaction of FDI to policy variables and other determinants. For 
instance, investors might want to adopt ‘wait and see’ attitude to the impact of governments’ macroeconomic 
policies and institutional reforms. In such circumstance FDI will flow to and investors will increase their stakes 
when the implementation of such policies proves successful and beneficial. The   application of foreign aid to 
create the favourable economic and institution environment also takes time. In view of all these, empirical 
literature suggests lagging all variables and using system GMM estimator of Arellano & Bover (1995) and 
Blundell & Bond (1998) to obtain efficient results. 
Finally the assumption that ‘oil and mineral exporting countries’ attracts  mainly resource-seeking FDI 
and the application of that to make deterministic statement about the relationship between resource-seeking FDI 
and the three classifications of foreign aid could be problematic. Even though in the absence of continuous 
disaggregate FDI data for Africa, this approach gives some suggestive results, it will be recommended that future 
studies take this issue up when disaggregate data is available to find out how the different types of  FDI react to 
aid flows. This is particularly crucial in Africa where most countries receive disproportionate sectoral flow of 
FDI. By this attempt, policy makers and donors alike will be able to know which type of FDI is incompatible 
with which category of foreign aid and why, so that the appropriate strategies could be adopted to maximise the 
benefits of aid.  
It must however be stated that in spite of these limitations the study presents systematic and interesting 
results and almost all the specifications produce an R-square of 75% on the average. This means that on average 
the explanatory variables and the methodology adopted in this study could explain about 75% of the variations in 
the dependent variable, FDI.  
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Appendix  
Table 4: List of Countries included in the Sample 
Africa Countries Other  Developing Countries 
Algeria                        Lesotho                                Albania                                       Iran             
Angola                                                   Madagascar Armenia                           Jamaica 
Benin                                                                                     Malawi Argentina Jordan 
Botswana                                                                                Mali Bangladesh Kazakhstan 
Burkina Faso                                                                      Mauritania Bolivia   Laos 
Cameroon                                                                                Mauritius Brazil   Lebanon 
Burundi                                                                                Morocco Cambodia Malaysia 
Cape Verde                                                                      Mozambique Chile    Mexico 
Central African Republic                                                                         Chad China Mongolia 
Congo D.R. Namibia Colombia Nepal 
Congo Republic Niger Costa Rica Nicaragua 
Cote d’Ivoire Nigeria Croatia Oman 
Egypt Rwanda Cuba Pakistan 
Equatorial Guinea Senegal Dominican Republic Panama 
Ethiopia South Africa Ecuador Paraguay 
Gabon Gambia El Salvador Peru 
Sudan Togo Fiji Papua New Guinea 
Ghana Guinea Guatemala Philippines 
Guinea Bissau Kenya Haiti Saudi Arabia 
Tunisia Uganda Honduras Sri Lanka 
Zambia Zimbabwe India Tajikistan 
Indonesia Thailand 
Trinidad & Tobago Turkey 
Uruguay Uzbekistan 
Venezuela Yemen 
Viet Nam 
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